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The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Law
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE UNITING FOR PEACE
RESOLUTION
Dina Youssef Elsharkawy
Supervised by Professor Hani Sayed
ABSTRACT
The Rwanda genocide during the 1990s showed the failure of the international
community to prevent mass atrocities and save civilians’ lives. The current
movement toward advancing the Responsibility to Protect Resolution has grown
out of recognition of the global community’s insufficient response to the 20th
century mass atrocities. As a result the concept of R2P was born during that time
in order to save people from crimes against humanity and genocide. However,
since the 1990s until today crimes and violence against civilians continue to
occur. For example, the situation in several Arab countries and the attacks against
civilians such as Libya and Syria lead us to question concepts such as the
responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. This thesis explores the
concept of R2P within the UN system. This paper argues that R2P resolution
should be done within the UN as it is an international organization which should
have the authority to apply the concept of R2P. The problem is that within the UN
Security Council the five permanent members maintain undue control because of
their veto power. All countries in the UN should participate in deciding whether it
is urgent and useful to intervene in a country to save its civilians or not. The thesis
mainly evaluates the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a way to overcome the 5
Permanent members veto power.
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I. Introduction
The Rwanda genocide showed the failure of the international community to save
civilians.The Secretary General Kofi Annan said that “the international community failed
Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret.”1From April to July
1994, members of the Hutu ethnic majority in the east-central African nation of Rwanda
murdered as many as 800,000 people, mostly of the Tutsi minority. 2 It was the
culmination of longstanding ethnic competition and tensions between the minority Tutsi
who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu peoples, who had come to
power in the rebellion of 1959–62 and overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. 3 In 2000, the UN
explicitly declared its reaction to Rwanda a failure.4 The concept of R2P was born during
that time in order to save people from crimes against humanity and genocide. This was
considered a tool in order to intervene to save civilians. However, since the 1990s until
today several crimes and violence against civilians continue to occur. The issue is that the
international community has a responsibility to stop such violence which should be done
within the United Nations as the universal organization with 193 members.
Recently the Middle East is facing many changes starting with the revolution in Tunisia,
Egypt and then in Libya. In Libya following widespread and systematic attacks against
the civilian population by the regime in the Libya, the UN Security Council, on 26
February 2011, unanimously adopted resolution 1970, making explicit reference to the
responsibility to protect deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of
human rights in strife-torn Libya,”5 the Security Council demanded an end to the
violence, recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population, and
imposed a series of international sanctions. 6 The Council also decided to refer the
situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March

1

UN chief's Rwanda genocide regret, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm (26
March, 2004)
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Rwanda: How the genocide happened , available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13431486
5
Background
Information
on
the
Responsibility
to
Protect,
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml
6
Id.

2011,7 the Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end
to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute crimes against
humanity. The Council authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to
protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. Also in Africa in response
to the escalating, post-election violence against the population of Côte d’Ivoire in late
2010 and early 2011, the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011, 8 unanimously adopted
resolution 1975 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters
of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. 9The resolution cited the
primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians, called for the immediate transfer
of power to President Ouattara, and reaffirmed that the UN operation in Cote d’ Ivore
(“UNOCI”) could use all necessary means to protect life and property. 10 In order to
protect the people of Côte d’Ivoire from further atrocities, UNOCI on 4 April 2011 began
a military operation, and President Gbagbo’s hold on power ended on 11 April when he
was arrested by President Ouattara’s forces after days of fighting with UNOCI and the
French military.

11

These crises lead us to think about the concept of R2P and its application in order to
protect the civilians. The UN’s main purpose is to maintain peace and security and R2P is
a tool to reach this goal. This paper argues that R2P should be done within the UN system
but not only within the Security Council because of the veto power. The problem is that
the UN’s enforcement system and in particularly within the Security Council does not
represent all countries of the UN. The five permanent members (France, United States,
United Kingdom, Russia and China) through their veto can decide whether to pass a
resolution concerning the right to intervene in a country or not.
The General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution while offering a means to get
around this veto power is still problematic because it is not binding.
7

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, SC/10200 ( march 2011)

8

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975, S/RES/1975 ( march 2011)
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
9
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There are debates concerning the necessity of R2P, on one hand some think that it is
useful in order to save the live of the civilians, for example, in the article The
Responsibility to Protect Human Rights David Miller, stated that:
R2P is the responsibility of the international community and that the protection of
human rights is one of the main aims of global governance. It is one of the main
reasons for thinking that governance must exist on a global and not merely a
national level. When states are unable to protect the human rights of their citizens,
or indeed are actively involved in violating those rights on a significant scale, then
‘the world community’ has a responsibility to step in and ensure that these rights
are protected. 12
Also Mehrdad Payandeh stated that:
The concept of the responsibility to protect constitutes an attempt to change the
prefix of the ongoing debate about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention. 2 At the core of the concept lies a two-dimensional understanding of
responsibility: (1) the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens from
atrocities, and (2) the responsibility of the international community to prevent and
react to massive human rights violations. 13
On the other hand, some scholars consider it as a form of colonialism. For example,
William Engdahl mentions in the article Humanitarian Neo-colonialism: Framing Libya
and Reframing War that:
The most remarkable facet of NATO's war against Libya is the fact that world
opinion, that ever so nebulous thing, has accepted an act of overt military
aggression against a sovereign country guilty of no violation of the UN Charter in
an act of de facto neo-colonialism, a 'humanitarian' war in violation of basic
precepts of the laws of nations14
This paper does not analyze whether R2P is good or bad. However, this paper argues that
the R2P resolution should be done within the UN as an international organization which
should have the authority to apply the concept of R2P.

12

David Miller, The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights 1 ( February 2006)
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/papers/Session6_Miller.pdf
13
Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility
To Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking 470 ( 2010), http://www.yjil.org/print/volume
14
F. William Engdahl, Humanitarian Neo-colonialism: Framing Libya and Reframing War ( may 2011)
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24617
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Part I of the thesis describes the evolution of the R2P concept. Part II explains the legality
of the R2P concept within the UN Charter with a focus on the authority of the Security
Council to issue resolution as part of its main purpose which is to maintain peace and
security. Part III evaluates the role of the General Assembly to maintain peace and
security. It evaluates in details the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a solution to
alternative the Security Councils veto power control.

4

II. Evolution of the concept of R2P within the UN
A. Definition of R2P
In this section I will clarify the meaning of responsibility to protect. The concept of R2P
has many sources: the rise of international humanitarian law starting with the late
nineteenth century and accelerating in the period after World War II and the growing
willingness of the UN Security Council, since the end of the Cold War, to authorize
forceful and sometimes coercive actions inside refractory or weak states. 15 The concept
of R2P came a result of the international community‘s feeling of a duty to protect
civilians, in particular, against crimes such as genocide and this should be done within the
framework of the UN.

16

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international security

and human rights doctrine which includes several important principles:
1. The primary responsibility for the protection of populations lies with the state.
This is recognition that sovereignty includes not just rights, but responsibilities;
2. When governments are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, the
international community has a responsibility to take action;
3. The international community’s responsibility is a continuum of measures
including prevention, reaction to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered
societies.
4. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian
and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails
to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international
community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective
use of force through the UN Security Council. 17
It is clear from this definition that under R2P state sovereignty is not absolute. The
international community has a responsibility to intervene when governments and fails to
protect its populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against

15

Parliamentary hearing at the United Nations, 2 (20-21 November 2008) ,http://www.ipu.org/splze/unga08/s4.pdf
16
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect 3 ( Nov. - Dec., 2002),
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-00/Evans.pdf
17
Hugh Breakey, The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Review and
Analysis,
available
at
http://www.academia.edu/1213148/Review_and_Analysis_2012_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Protection_of_
civilians_in_Armed_Conflict
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humanity. The concept of humanitarian intervention and then R2P was created as a result
of the inability of the international community to intervene to save people as a result of
massive violence. The dilemma was to have a way to balance between the right of state
sovereignty which is mentioned in the UN charter and the main role of the UN which is
to protect human rights. Each country which signed the UN Charter has agreed to realize
these principles. The issue was to find a way to balance between these principles. This
was found with the birth of the concept of humanitarian intervention and then R2P.
The UN was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries seeking to establish a new
basis for international relations and avoid the horrors of the two World Wars. The
preamble of the charter stated that one of the main aims of the UN is to protect human
rights:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small18
Article 1 (3) mentions on of the purposes of the UN charter “ promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.”

19

In the meantime the charter in Article 2 (1) specifies

that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members
and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter: “nothing should authorize intervention in matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.” 20 The aim at that time was to
avoid another world war. The pursuit of human rights was a central reason for creating
the UN. World War II atrocities and genocide led to a ready consensus that the new
organization must work to prevent any similar tragedies in the future. An early objective
was creating a legal framework for considering and acting on complaints about human
rights violations. The UN Charter obliges all member nations to promote "universal

18

Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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respect for, and observance of, human rights" and to take "joint and separate action" to
that end. 21
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in
1948. Its first article mentions that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights.”22 In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 are considered the
cornerstones of international humanitarian law (IHL). Unlike Human Rights Law, which
applies both during peacetime and wartime, IHL applies only in wartime. International
human rights law and international humanitarian law both attempts to protect the lives,
dignity and health of individuals but from different perspectives. Both aim to protect
human life, prohibit torture, prohibit discrimination, and provision for the protection of
women and children.

23

IHL deals with hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status

and the protection of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. IHRL is concerned with
the freedom of press of expression and right to assembly. 24
The concept of humanitarian intervention was not legitimate during the Cold War. Unlike
conflicts during the Cold War; the level of violence directed at civilians during the post
cold war has been unprecedented. For example, while soldiers constituted the highest
percentage of casualties in both the First and Second World Wars, approximately 70% of
the victims in the post-Cold War era have been civilians. 25 In addition, while conflicts
before and during the Cold War were mostly inter-state, nearly 80% of the wars that
erupted in the 1990s have been intra-state.26 The concept of humanitarian intervention
was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War because states placed more value on
sovereignty. However, there was a significant shift of attitudes during the 1990s as the
21

Id.

22

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
Id.
24
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law Similarities and differences 2,
http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf
25
Era Alhaji, The Intervention Dilemma The Dynamics of Civilian Protection in the post-Cold War 22
,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Chap2.pdf
26
Id.
23
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world started witnessing gross violations of human rights at a scale that was not seen
since the Second World War In some cases, as with Rwanda, intervention was too late
and too weak to prevent a humanitarian crisis. The 20th century was marked by some of
the worst atrocities committed by human beings such as the genocide in Rwanda, crimes
against humanity and gross violations of human rights. These events raise the question of
the responsibility of the international community once states are not able or not willing to
protect their own populations. 27 As a result the international community felt the
importance of humanitarian intervention and at that time the concept of R2P was born
which mentions that state sovereignty is not only a privilege but also a responsibility.
28

The first definition of the Responsibility to Protect was developed under the lead of the

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in the
December 2001 The Responsibility to Protect report, by the Canadian International
Development Research Centre.

29

Two key principles were defined as being fundamental

to the concept of responsibility: the first is that state sovereignty implies responsibility,
and the primary responsibility for the protection of a people lies with the state itself; the
second is that, where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to
halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility
to protect. 30 Taking this definition into consideration and looking at the UN Charter we
can conclude that state sovereignty is not absolute because in cases where there is
massive violence in a country the international community has a responsibility to
intervene and help people. If a state were to fail to protect its citizens, it means that the
state failed to fulfill this responsibility. Looking at the definition these principles in the
2001 report, it is obvious that the aim behind their formulation was to provide a new
definition of the concept of sovereignty, in an attempt to guide it in a new direction,
focusing on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility.

31

27

Id. ,at 26
Id.
29
Protecting the Responsibility to Protect,( Spring 2009),
articles/protecting-the-responsibility-to-protect/
30
Id.
31
Id.
28
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http://crisismapper.wordpress.com/papers-

Later on in 2005, the discussion focused more on the supposed broader concept of
protecting those in danger. This was clearly observed at the 2005 World Summit, “Each
individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 32 Furthermore, member states
also showed their commitment by accepting that responsibility, pledging to act in
accordance. “The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help
states to exercise this responsibility, and support the United Nations in establishing an
early warning capability.” 33 The resulting documents referred to the responsibility of the
international community in using “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.”34 Finally, the international community gave further commitment to
supporting states, “Building the necessary capacity to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and to assist those
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”

35

This report indentifies in

details and supports the importance of R2P and its necessity in order to protect civilians.
The effort of explaining the importance of R2P did not end in 2005, as recently, in
January 2009 Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon released a report entitled implementing the
responsibility to protect. This report the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described
R2P’s three conceptual “pillars.” First, each state has the “enduring responsibility to
protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.”

36

Second, the

international community has the responsibility to assist states in meeting their obligations
under the first pillar. Third, if a state “manifestly fails” to protect its people, then the
international community has the responsibility to respond “in a timely and decisive
32

Implementing the responsibility to protect report of the Secretary-General, G.A. 63 Sess., UN Doc.
A/63/677 (2009)
33
Protecting the Responsibility to Protect, (Spring 2009), http://crisismapper.wordpress.com/papersarticles/protecting-the-responsibility-to-protect/
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Implementing the responsibility to protect report of the Secretary-General, G.A. 63 Sess., UN Doc.
A/63/677 (2009)
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manner, using Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter,” and by taking a range of
peaceful or forceful measures. 37
All these reports refer to the same idea which is the creation of a different understanding
of state sovereignty. They all mention that state sovereignty is not absolute and that the
international community has the responsibility to protect. The UN as an international
organization is responsible for achieving its aim which is to protect human rights.
The following section is explaining in details the evolution of the concept of R2P staring
from the 90s until now.
B. phase one: beginning of R2P concept 1990s- 2000
Phase one which began in 1990 and continued until 2000 marked the beginning of the
sense of the responsibility toward civilians suffering from mass atrocities .The end of the
20th century marked a change in the nature of armed conflict from large inter-state wars
to violent internal conflicts. The genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia
demonstrated massive failures by the international community to prevent mass atrocities
as many civilians were victims of such violence. 38 As a result of that near the end of the
1990s it was necessary to shift the debate about crisis prevention and response .This
meant that the security of the community and the individual and not only the state, must
be priorities for national and international policies. As a result of this sentiment the real
start of the concept of R2P was during the 1990s following profound sense of fear at the
failure of the international community to act effectively in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.
All this created the sense and the need for a broadly accepted new norm to guide the
international response to atrocities. 39 In addition, this need became vital in 1999 with the
NATO bombing to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which began after the situation had

37

Id.
Adèle Brown , Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?(
june 2008), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP08-55
39
Id.
38
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been deadlocked in the Security Council: even many who considered the intervention
morally legitimate were troubled by its illegality under international law.

40

These violent events which occurred during the 1990s led to a debate among members of
the international community. The United Nations was deeply divided between those who
insisted on a right of humanitarian intervention and those who viewed such a doctrine as
an indefensible infringement of state sovereignty. 41 The international community felt that
something was really needed to end such crises but the way to get out or to help the
people suffering from such violation was not clear. The concept of humanitarian
intervention was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War because states placed
more value on sovereignty.42 However, there was a significant shift of attitudes during
the 1990s, which led the way in pressing new humanitarian claims within international
society. The UN Secretary-General noted the extent of this change in a speech to the
General Assembly in September 1999. Kofi Annan declared that “there was a developing
international norm to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk from genocide and mass
killing, but still not everyone was convinced about the legality of humanitarian
intervention.”43
Humanitarian intervention was seen by the international community as a dangerous and
a way to intervene in the internal affairs of countries. Many issues were raised by the
international community such as the legal justification for military action without
Security Council, the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, and the way in
which the NATO allies conducted the operation.

44

During that time, Secretary-General

Kofi Annan warned that the UN risked discrediting itself if it failed to respond to
catastrophes such as Rwanda and Srebrenica, and he challenged member states to agree
on a framework for action.45 The Secretary General at that time only challenged member
states to have a framework, this way of evaluating the situation marked in my point of
40

Id.
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2 ( December 2001),
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
42
Id.
41

43

Secretary General Annual report to the General Assembly , SG/SM/7136 GA/9596 ( 1999)
ICISS report supra note 41, at VII
45
Id.
44
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view the first phase of the evolution of R2P, the Secretary General stated that “if
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity.”

46

Since the beginning of the

1990s until 2001 the concept of R2P was not really clear. The issue during that time was
only marked by debates about the way to have a framework of actions but nothing more
than that. The idea of humanitarian intervention was seen at that time necessary and the
Secretary General mentioned that in several speeches but the issue needed a legal
justification for intervention. The issue was that it was important to have a legal way to
permit intervention and to balance between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty.
This was a real challenge during that time and it was in response to this challenge that the
Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at the
General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS):
Our Commission was asked to wrestle with the whole range of questions – legal,
moral, operational and political – rolled up in this debate, to consult with the
widest possible range of opinion around the jworld, and to bring back a report that
would help the Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common
ground. 47
C. Phase two: International community and R2P 2001-2004
The second phase of R2P began in 2001, the international community started to feel the
importance of the implementation of R2P as a result several reports were issued in order
to clarify this concept. In 2001 the principle of the responsibility to protect was first
elaborated by a group of prominent international human rights leaders comprising the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

48

The ICISS was

formed under the sponsorship of the Government of Canada with the goal of developing
global political consensus about how and when the international community should
respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and other

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
47
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widespread crimes against humanity. 49 This report formulated the alternative principle of
the responsibility to protect, focusing not on the right of outsiders to intervene but on the
responsibility of all states to protect people at risk. 50
The report elaborated the meaning of the concept of R2P as it shows the responsibility of
all states to save the life of people suffering from great violence. The international
community stated the responsibility to address massive violations of humanitarian norms
and ensuring respect for the sovereign rights of nation states. The commission was led by
Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special
Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Focusing on the right of humanitarian intervention,
this report examined when if ever it is appropriate for states for take coercive and in
particular military action, against another state for the purpose of protecting populations
at risk.51 In essence, the group concluded that when a group (or groups) of people is
suffering from acts of violence resulting from internal war, insurgency, repression or state
failure, and the state where these crimes are taking place is unable or unwilling to act to
prevent or protect its peoples, the international community has a moral duty to intervene
to bring to an end these atrocities.52
The central theme of the report is that those sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens, and when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. 53The report generates a
new international consensus on these issues. The main aim at that stage was mainly to
have the feeling of the responsibility to intervene.

54

The issue at that time was to

encourage the world to participate in such action whenever the UN considers its
necessity. The ICISS outlined the “just cause threshold”, which needs to be present in
order to justify military intervention for the purpose of human protection. 55 An additional
volume was compiled to the report, the responsibility to protect: research, bibliography,
49

Id.
Id.,at VIII
51
Id.
52
Id.at 2-5
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.,at XII
50

13

background. It was added in order to clarify the objectives of the report. The UN
Secretary General Kofi-Annan at the launch of the Commission's report on February 15
2002 clarified the objective of R2P during that time. He explained that the report is trying
to encourage countries to participate in this kind of intervention to protect people. Also
he stated that it is very important to draw the line between the idea of sovereignty and the
duty to save the live of people suffering from violence:
I sought to develop the idea of two notions of sovereignty: one for States, another
for individuals. This idea was rooted firmly in the UN Charter, which affirms the
sovereignty of States even as it challenges us to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of was . . . How to protect individual lives while maintaining and even
strengthening the sovereignty of States has become clearer with the publication of
this report. You are taking away the last excuses of the international community
for doing nothing when doing something can save lives. 56
However, the support for R2P was still limited after the release of the ICISS report. As
ongoing humanitarian disasters, including the failure to protect the people of Darfur,
signaled that more needed to be done by the international community as a whole to
respond to genocide and other threats against populations. 57 The UN believed that it was
still necessary to issue more reports in order to implement the principle of R2P. In
particular after the Iraqi invasion in 2003 the illegal US invasion of Iraq highlighted the
importance of the matters and it was essential to stress on the concept of R2P. 58 In
September 2003, the Secretary-General called for Member States to strengthen the UN to
better advance development, security, and the protection of human rights. In recognition
of the urgent need to address the UN failures to respond to genocide, the SecretaryGeneral challenged Member States to include protection from genocide as part of this UN
reform agenda.

59

As a result of that the responsibility to protect doctrine received renewed emphasis in
2004 when the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the High-Level

56

SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSES INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY SEMINAR ON
‘THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT’, SG/SM/8125, (2002)
57
Id.
58
Jentleson Duke, Humanitarian Intervention and Sovereignty Delegation: Why? When? Who Decides?
How Much? (March 2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/pdf/workshop06sp/jentleson
59
Id.

14

Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Panel was established to give more
details concerning the new principle. It identifies major threats facing the international
community in the broad field of peace and security and generated new ideas about
policies and institutions aimed at preventing or confronting these challenges. 60 It is clear
that the panel’s purpose was to address the importance of R2P in maintaining peace and
security which is the aim of the UN as it is mentioned in the UN Charter. After a year of
deliberations, in December 2004 the panel issued its findings in a report entitled A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.61 The report provided a new assessment of the
numerous challenges ahead for peaceful interstate relations and made recommendations
of the necessity of these challenges to be met effectively through collective action. The
Panel endorsed this emerging norm, stating that:
There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the right to intervene of any
State, but the responsibility to protect of every State when it comes to people
suffering from avoidable catastrophe mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by
forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. .
.We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing,
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which
sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.62
The report refers to the notion of collective responsibility in order to highlight the
importance of R2P and humanitarian intervention. The Secretary-General of the United
Nations Kofi A. Annan mentioned in his statement the importance of the principle of R2P
and he used the world‘s urgent need to apply R2P and the necessity to maintain peace and
security:
I hope people all over the world will read this report, discuss it, and urge their
Governments to take prompt decisions on its recommendations. I believe the great
majority of them will share my feeling that there is an urgent need for the nations
of the world to come together and reach a new consensus - both on the future of
collective security and on the changes needed if the United Nations is to play its
part. For my part, I will move quickly to consider and implement, as appropriate,
60
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those recommendations that are within my purview. I urge the other organs of the
United Nations to do the same. 63
D. Phase three: legal framework of R2P 2005-2012
Phase three which began in 2005 is characterized by the formation the legal framework of
R2P. In September 2005, R2P was once again cheered up this time with the full support
of the international community.

64

This year marked a new phase of the evolution of R2P

as it marked the emergence of the legal framework. In 2005 at the 60th session of the
U.N. General Assembly gathering, 191 heads of state and government representatives
unanimously endorsed a resolution supporting the Responsibility to protect doctrine.
65

This was the first time a resolution was issued concerning R2P. This resolution laid the

foundations for a new global moral compact between every State and every population on
earth. As adopted, atrocity crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity including ethnic
cleansing and war crimes - were considered a universal concern and therefore were the
responsibility of the international community. 66
At the World Summit in 2005 the member states included R2P in the Outcome
Document. The next year, in April 2006, the UN Security Council formalized their
support of the R2P by reaffirming the provisions of the paragraphs from the World
Summit document.67In paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit document, Heads of
State and government agreed to the following:
That each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. And it
is also a responsibility for prevention of these crimes. Furthermore, the
international community should encourage or assist states to exercise this
responsibility and that the international community has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect
populations threatened by these crimes. When a state manifestly fails in its
protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international
63
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community must take stronger measures, including collective use of force
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.68
In paragraph 138 and 139 of the General Assembly resolution the right to intervene under
the principle of R2P is to protect people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. 69 The resolution provides a clear image of R2P and its legality
according to the UN Charter. This resolution marked a difference in the evolution of R2P
as it gives this concept a legal meaning. According to this resolution R2P should be
executed only through the UN which has the right to issue resolutions to intervene in a
state whenever there is a threat to international peace and security.

70

As R2P is considered part of human security the World Summit outcome refers to the
concept of human security. According to paragraph 143 the purpose of human security is
to enable all individuals to be free from fear and want, and to enjoy all their rights and
fully develop their human potential.

71

In the meantime, the Responsibility to protect

focuses on protecting populations from specific cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleaning and crimes against humanity. Such cases result in large and complex
humanitarian crises that are costly in terms of human lives, loss of social capital and
financial resources, and are more difficult to resolve later. 72It is clear that both concepts
are related but human security is much larger in scope, covering many more concerns.
Human security includes the protection of people from severe and prevalent threats, and
situations.73 The issues Human Security addresses include, but are not limited to, the
following: organized crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance,
armed conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development and
resources and environment.74

Following the General Assembly World Summit, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
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on 28 April 2006. Resolution 1674 contains the first official Security Council reference to
the Responsibility to protect as it reaffirms the provisions of paragraph 138 and 139 of
the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

75

Then in Resolution 1706 31 August200676, which sought to provide a peacekeeping
mission to Darfur, the Council once again recognized the importance of R2P and reasserted its commitment to the principles of this doctrine. 77 This was the first time R2P
was applied within the framework of the UN and with the Security Council resolution.
In September 2006, the UN Security Council had their first meeting on the situation in
Burma and in January 2007 proposed a resolution calling for the cessation of grave
violations of human rights. However, China and Russia both used their veto to block this
resolution claiming that the internal affairs of a state did not belong in the Security
Council and that the situation did not constitute threats to international peace and
security. 78
The effort of the Secretary General to emphasize the importance of the implementations
of R2P within the UN is still in process and this is clear in several reports were issued.
Recently, in January 2009, Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon released a report entitled
implementing the Responsibility to Protect the first comprehensive UN document on the
R2P. The report clarifies how to understand R2P and outlines measures and actors
involved in rendering the norm operational.
Based on paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit, the Secretary-General
suggested a three-pillar approach namely 1) the protection responsibilities of the
state, 2) international assistance and capacity building, and 3) timely and decisive
response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 79
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Moreover, another report was issued in 2010 by the Secretary-General entitled on early
warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect it identified gaps and proposed
ways to improve the UN’s ability to use early warnings more effectively, including
information from field operations and improvements to early, flexible and balanced
responses where there is risk of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or ethnic
cleansing.80
Moreover, in 2011 the UN General Assembly held an informal interactive dialogue on
the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect. The report by the Secretary-General emphasized the need for effective globalregional collaboration to help implement the responsibility to protect.

81

The report

identified gaps and proposed ways for the UN to strengthen its cooperation and draw on
information and analysis from regional and sub-regional arrangements to identify signs of
danger and undertake or support timely and effective preventative action at the subregional, regional, or global level. 82
This chapter explained the evolution of the R2P within the UN and shows that this
concept passed through several stages, starting in the 1990s with the Rwanda genocide
and the first official resolution (1674) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in
2006 until recently with the case of Libya

83

and Côte d’Ivoire.

84

Also this chapter

emphasized the main reports issued from 2001 until 2011 which explains the concept of
R2P and its implementation within the UN. After describing the evolution of R2P, the
following chapter analyzes the legality of R2P within the UN Charter.
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III. UN charter and R2P
The concept of R2P emerged several years after the creation of the UN Charter. The UN
Charter has not been modified since 1945 while the R2P concept was born in the 1990s.
The concept of the responsibility to protect therefore need to be viewed within the
context of the existing international legal system of the use of force and collective
security as it is defined and shaped by the U.N. Charter. This chapter analyzes the way
the R2P fits within the existing framework of protection of international peace and
security both globally and with the help of regional organizations For this purpose the
following section analyzes the issue of the prohibition or threat of use of force within the
UN charter, also the authorization of the Security Council to intervene under chapter VII
in order to maintain peace and security also the cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations to intervene in order to maintain peace and security.
A. Use of force in the UN Charter and R2P
1. Legality of use of force according to the UN Charter
This chapter clarifies the legality of use of force according to the UN Charter. The first
part of the chapter identifies the reasons that resulted in the creation of the UN. In 1946
United Nations (UN) took the place of the League of Nations, which had the same
aspirations. The UN Charter is more detailed and precise than the League Covenant,
since the founders of the UN aimed to establish more effective mechanism to support
international peace and security. 85 In this framework, in order to keep the peace and
security, the Charter first of all offers peaceful settlement of disputes. 86 Article 33 of the
Charter provides that the parties to any dispute can seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice, and if it is
necessary the Security Council can call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such
85
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means. 87If a dispute cannot be resolved by these peaceful means, and the continuance of
it constitutes a threat to the peace, the Security Council will make recommendations, or
decide what measures scan be taken. These measures, which include use of force as well,
are clarified in Chapter VII of the Charter.88
The UN Charter constitutes the prevailing normative framework that governs the use of
force .The Preamble to the Charter sets out the fundamental purpose of the organization,
which is to maintain international peace and security. 89 To reach this objective, the first
chapter identifies a series of common aims and principles or guidelines for action, the
fundamental purpose of which is the maintenance of international peace and security art.
1.1.90 The general prohibition of the use of force can be considered as the starting point
for the Charter’s system for the maintenance of international peace and security art. 2.4.
91

According to Robert Kolb92, the system created in the Charter contains two parts: the

preventive part which is dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes in Ch. VI and
economic and social cooperation in Ch. X and a repressive part that regulates the
coercive powers of the UNSC in Ch. VII. The maintenance of international peace and
security rests fundamentally with the Security Council and the General Assembly. The
UNSC is the organization that holds the primary responsibility for this and must carry out
its duties in this respect in accordance with the means and principles of the United
Nations art. 24(2.)93 This is mentioned in Article 24(1 )of the Charter, which justifies this
responsibility being conferred on the UNSC in order to ensure prompt and effective
action.94 The principal exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force are the
right to legitimate self-defense and the collective security system. The first of these
exceptions is set out in Article 51, which set up the characteristics of the right of
87
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legitimate self-defense (imminent, individual or collective), the enabling factor (armed
attack) and the conditions under which it must be carried out (its provisional nature and
subsidiary with respect to the collective security system).

95

To these, three additional

conditions deriving from general international law must be added, namely immediacy,
necessity and proportionality. 96
The second exception to the prohibition of the use of force is the collective security
system mentioned in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council is responsible
for determining the existence of threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression,
which vary from vague threats through to specific acts of aggression art. 39. 97Once the
situation has been categorized as one of these types, the UNSC has powers to make
recommendations or decisions to maintain or reestablish the peace. Moreover, the UNSC
can state provisional measures to prevent the situation from worsening, such as a
ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops, a truce or an armistice, amongst others art. 40.98 In
order to maintain or reestablish international peace and security the UNSC can take
measures that do not involve the use of armed force, but which impact on the economic
situation, transport and communications, or diplomatic relations art. 41.99 In case these
measures are considered inadequate or fail to bring about the desired effect, the UNSC
can take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. These actions may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations art. 42.
It is important to stress that even if the measures stated within article 41 are legally
binding on member States, the military measures of Article 42 are linked to the signing of
special agreements through which the signatory states place at the disposal of the UNSC
“armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security” (Art. 43).
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These agreements

have never actually been signed, meaning that the system of collective security provided
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for in the Charter has never been implemented. The UNSC has thus created substitute
channels of action, provided for in the Charter or otherwise, in order to carry out coercive
measures.

101

First of all, use is made of regional arrangements or agencies in order to

apply coercive measures under the UN’s authority Art. 53. Second, the UNSC has
authorized member States to use force to guarantee that embargoes are respected or to reestablish international peace and security. Third, it has used the authorization of
peacekeeping operations and of multinational forces carrying out equivalent functions to
defend its mandate. 102
The authorization of the use of force by the UNSC must fulfill five requisites in order to
be legal. First of all, the UN must pass a resolution authorizing coercive action by a
multinational force. As Olivier Corten points out, UNSC authorizations resorting to the
use of force can be explicit, when specific measures are detailed in the text of the
resolution itself, or implicit when the resolution resorts to the customary method of all
necessary means. 103 This latter method of authorization has been the one most used by
the UNSC. Second, any resolution that is passed must comply with the Charter, both in
its form and content. Third, any military action must be in accordance with the UNSC
resolution.

104

Olivier Corten states that, “in practice, the UNSC has resorted to the

criterion of necessity, although prescribing the use of all means necessary does not
represent the unconditional and unlimited right to use military force .Given that actual
cases of authorization have been highly varied, their classification is difficult.”105 In
addition, he stated that interpretation must be done on a case by case basis and the
transcripts of the debates reviewed in order to be certain that the use of force is
understood to be included in the resolution.106 Fourth, both financing and the command
of operations are independent of the UN. 107 The cost of the operation is to be met by the
101
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participating states, together with voluntary contributions from other states which are
unable or unwilling to get involved on the ground. The operations are to be carried out by
a multinational force; an aggregation of national forces each operating under its own flag.
Fifth, the UNSC must stay in control of the authorized action. Basically, the means of
control used by the UNSC for any authorized action include the obligatory submission of
written reports from the states involved, the state commanding the operation or the
Secretary-General. 108
Kolb and Corthen’s analysis for the legality of use of force within the UN is same as the
analysis of Evans. According to Evans, the use of force in contemporary international law
refers to one principle and two exceptions in the Charter of the United Nations. One
principle refers to the Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the principle of the prohibit ion
on the threat or use of force and the two exceptions refer to the legal use of force
provided in the U.N. Charter, mainly the right of self-defense, Article 51 and the forcible
action taken or authorized by the U.N.
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Articles 42 and 53 the former is the unilateral

resort to force by states, the latter is the use of force in the U.N. collective enforcement
system.

110

Essentially, only two types of military actions are considered legal, one is the

action authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations; the other is the inherent
right of self-defense of victim states. There are three ways to initiate military intervention
under R2P: The first is an authorization from the Security Council of the UN; the second
is the General Assembly redresses the situation under the Uniting for Peace procedure for
an authorization for an emergent protection action; the third is regional organizations act
under the Chapter VIII of the UN charter, subject to their seeking authorization from the
Security Council. 111
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The following paragraph focuses on the first way which is the authorization from the
Security Council of the UN. The Responsibility to Protect leads the Security Council to
interpret broadly the concept of a threat to the peace in accordance with the U.N. Charter,
only when the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39, Article 42, a
global enforcement action or Article 53 a regional enforcement action can be invoked to
carry out or authorize implementation military actions. 112 If genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleaning and crimes against humanity are committed within a sovereign state, which is
not related to aggression, it does not necessarily result in a threat to the peace or a breach
of the peace. The determination of a threat to international peace and security is a
prerequisite for the authorization of military intervention from the Security Council.

113

Basically, the threats to the peace in Article 39 of the UN Charter refer to cross-border
conflicts. The implementation of R2P depends on the interpretation of a threat to peace
by the Security Council. 114 The perpetration of the four crimes within a state constitutes a
threat to peace in Article 39 of the UN Charter, is not answered in the Charter nor does it
stipulate what situation is a threat to peace.

115

. Statements made at the San Francisco

conference indicate that the drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately intended to leave the
determination of what constitutes a threat to the peace to the discretion of the Security
Council. 116 This approach is further supported by the ruling of the International Court of
Justice in the Certain Expenses case in which the court held that every organ of the
United Nations principally determines the scope of its jurisdiction. 117 Theoretically, it is
possible for the Security Council to authorize military intervention through an expansion
of interpretation of “a threat to the peace” to cover internal conflicts involving four
crimes and the four crimes committed by a government.Mehrdad Payandeh stated that
112
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“The Council acts on a case-by-case basis, and often emphasizes the unique character of
a situation in which it decided to intervene. The endorsement of the responsibility to
protect can therefore contribute to the entrenchment of the power of the Security Council
to take humanitarian action.” 118 Yao Huang in the article On the Military Intervention
under the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect stated an example illustrating this
issue.119 In 2006 after several calls upon the Government of Burma to end the systematic
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Burma and to put an end to the
military operations targeting civilians the Security Council placed the issue of Burma as a
threat to international peace and security on its agenda China Russia voted no claiming
that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for discussing Burma. 120 In their
explanatory statements, the Chinese and Russian representatives stated that the proposed
resolution fell outside the mandate of the Security Council as the situation did not
threaten international or regional peace and was therefore not appropriate for action by
the Council. The Chinese representative argued that the situation in Burma is mainly an
internal affair of a sovereign state.121
Related to that example, an expansion of Article 39 the Security Council can determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
make recommendations, or decide what measures can be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security might raise
controversy as it causes concern from some states about infringements of sovereign and
intervention of internal affairs of other states. “Huang stated that many states and
scholars, particularly developing countries and their scholars question the authorization
of the use of force from the Security Council for military intervention on internal crisis in
other states in post-Cold War era.”122 The representative of China stated that the U.N
Charter imposes the Security Council a mandate to maintain international peace and
security, the prerequisite for action is the existence of a threat to the peace, the breach of
118
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the peace and act of aggression. 123 The Security Council should consider R2P within the
framework of the maintenance of international peace and security to avert the abuse of it.
This case about the situation in Myanmar shows that R2P is a tool that the UN can use to
maintain peace and security but the issue is to identify when it is a threat to international
peace and security. Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect Prompt the Security
Council to interpret broadly the Concept of “a threat to the Peace”
2. Legality of R2P according to the ICSS report and General Assembly World
Summit 2005
The following section analyzes the legality of R2P according to the ICSS report and the
General Assembly World Summit 2005. In the ICSS report the commission agreed that
the Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention action being carried out:
Those calling for an intervention must formally request such authorization, or
have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the SecretaryGeneral raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. The Security Council should
deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are
allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing; it should in this
context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might
support a military intervention. 124
In addition the commission added that article 42 authorizes the Security Council, in the
event that non-military measures prove inadequate to decide upon military measures as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 125 In addition
they stated that even if these powers were interpreted closely during the Cold War, since
then the Security Council has taken a very expansive view as to what constitutes
international peace and security. As a result, for this purpose, and in practice an
authorization by the Security Council has almost invariably been universally accepted as
conferring international legality on an action.
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development made by the International Commission on Intervention and State
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Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, the responsibility to protect concept started to be supported
by a diverse group of states, international and regional organizations and civil society
groups, and has led to major projects of systemic integration and rationalization at and
around the United Nations. 127 Anne Oeford stated that:
Many commentators, including most international lawyers, have argued that the
responsibility to protect concept remains of limited legal significance. Most
international lawyers have concluded that the version of the responsibility to
protect concept enshrined in the World Summit Outcome and accepted by
Members of the General Assembly cannot be understood to impose new legal
obligations that are binding upon states acting either unilaterally or collectively.
128

This means that according to the ICISS report R2P does not change any legal obligations
of the states which mean that R2P does not oppose the articles of the UN charter and that
it fits within the Charter. The World Summit does not add new obligations it only shows
them clearly.
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The responsibility of the state to protect those within its territory or

jurisdiction from genocide and other mass atrocities was already reflected in the
Genocide Convention,130 international and regional human rights treaties and the laws of
war. 131 Overall, both the ICISS report and the World Summit explains clearly that R2P is
legal and does not contradict the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter the main
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purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and security which means that R2P can be used as
a way to reach this goal.
B. UN and regional organization cooperation to implement R2P
The following section explains the cooperation between the UN as the universal
organization and regional organizations in maintaining peace and security. According to
article 24 in Chapter V of the Charter the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security is within the Security Council. The Charter provides a
role for regional organizations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security
in their respective regions.132 In Chapter VI Article 33(1), provides that parties to any
dispute endangering international peace and security must, first of all seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 133 In
Chapter VIII, Article 52(1) stipulates that nothing in the Charter is to preclude the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.
134

It goes on to ask member states entering into such arrangements or disputes through

such regional arrangements or constituting such agencies to make every effort to achieve
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 135 On the matter of
enforcement action by regional arrangements, under Chapter VII Article 51, of the
Charter, recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. Chapter
VIII, Article 53 (1), provides that the Security Council can, where appropriate, use such
regional arrangements and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
136

However no enforcement action can be taken under regional arrangements or by

regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. Furthermore, Article
54 provides that the Security Council can at all times be kept fully informed of activities
132
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undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for
the maintenance of international peace and security. 137
Overall, according to the UN Charter regional organizations can cooperate with the UN
in order to maintain peace and security. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the UN
and regional organizations was not enough. As the Cold War ended, it was hoped that the
relevant parts of the UN Charter concerning the role of regional organizations and
arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security could be invoked
effectively. However, the cooperation was not really sufficient until the 1990s. Therefore,

in the Agenda for Peace, issued on 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali
recommended a greater role for regional organizations in peace-related activities:
But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render
great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the
purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United
Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII. 138
In addition, the ICSS report pointed out the importance of such cooperation. According to
the ICSS report regional organizations can play an effective role in maintaining peace
and security. As many human disasters have significant direct effects on neighboring
countries through spill-over across national borders taking such forms as refugee flows or
use of territory as a base by rebel groups:139
Such neighboring states will thus usually have a strong collective interest, only
part of which will be motivated by humanitarian concerns, for dealing rapidly and
effectively with the catastrophe. It has long been recognized that neighboring
states acting within the framework of regional or sub-regional organizations are
often better placed to act than the UN, and Article 52 of the Charter has been
interpreted as giving them considerable flexibility in this respect. …All this
should facilitate mobilizing the necessary will for fulfilling the responsibility to
protect and for ensuring sustainability and follow-up. 140
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It is clear that it is better to involve regional organizations to help the UN in order restore
peace and security. As the regional organization can be more familiar with the countries
within the region and could help in the way to solve the conflict. According to the UN
Charter, the main body that can authorize any action is the Security Council. The only
thing regional organizations can do is to cooperate with the UN. This also means that the
implementation of R2P does not contradict the UN Charter. In interpreting the Charter
R2P is a tool to intervene in order to save civilians. The charter allows the Security
Council to enforce actions for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. A recent
example of the cooperation between regional organization and the UN is the case of a
crisis in Africa is the case of Côte d’ Ivoire.

141

The 2010 presidential election in Côte d’

Ivoire resulted in a massive internal armed conflict between opposing supporters. The
African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
responded to with efforts to resolve the crisis through mediation and diplomatic
pressure.142 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1975 on 30th March, 2011, considering that the attacks taking
place in Côte d’ Ivoire against the civilian population could amount to crimes against
humanity, determining that the situation in Côte d’ Ivoire continues to constitute a threat
to international peace and security. 143
Finally we can conclude that the concept of R2P has so far not modified the present law
and does not change any legal obligations of the use of force, but it has some effects on
the collective coercive measures of the U.N. The only issue the R2P concept adds is that
it is a tool for the Security Council to enforce its action. In addition, the UN Charter
recognizes legitimate roles for regional organizations and regional arrangements in
Chapter VIII.144 The Charter requires action by regional organizations always to be
subject to prior authorization from the Security Council and R2P is also a tool to enforce
the purpose of the UN. The problem is that within the Security Council not all the
countries participate in issuing such resolution also the five permanent use veto power in
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their interests. The system of the Security Council is not fair as it is important that most
members in the UN can have a voice in such decisions.

32

IV. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
This section explains the relation between the general assembly and the Security Council,
also it analyze the uniting for peace resolution and whether it could be a solution to
overcome the veto power or no.
The UN Charter grants the five permanent members veto power in three main areas:
Security Council decision-making, the Charter amendments, and the appointment of the
Secretary-General. Nowhere does the Charter oblige the P5 to provide an explanation for
any vetoes.145 The motivation for the P5 veto power is to ensure that the UN Security
Council did does suffer the same outcome as its predecessor the League of Nations 146
“The UN Security Council was created after the most destructive war in history to help
the world respond to global security threats.”147 Basically, the veto power was granted to
the P5 as way to reassure that their interests would not be ignored and in the hope that it
would ensure their participation in the new organization. 148Kara McDonald argues that
“The UN Charter establishes the UNSC as the premier international watchdog, designates
the five permanent members (P5) as guarantors of global peace, and endows each with a
veto.”149 However, since its establishment in 1946, the Security Council has been faced
with considerable criticism by many scholars such as Jonas von Freiesleben, Kara
McDonald, Sahar Okhovat and Erik Voeten. Since that time there have been many calls
for the reform of the Council. For example, in the report A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility it is stated that the Security Council needs to be reformed
Models A and B for enlargement, both of which suggested expanding the Council
to 24 members. Model A proposed adding six new permanent seats, but with no
145
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veto power, and three new two-year term elected seats. Model B created a new
category of eight seats, renewable every four years, and one new two-year
nonrenewable seat.150
A large part of the criticism is due to the structure of the Council that many believe is
undemocratic especially because it gives considerable power and privileges to certain
countries of the world. For example Jonas von Freiesleben stated that:
The Security Council is without a doubt the most powerful organ of the United
Nations. The Charter has given it primary responsibility for the maintenance of
global peace and security and its decisions are binding for all Member States. Its
limited geographical balance combined with five exclusive permanent seats that
have veto powers, however, makes the Security Council less representative than
desired by many Member States – especially emerging ‘middle’ powers – and
they are increasingly calling for a restructuring of the Council.151
The main example is the veto power of the Permanent Five. This was reflected in both
the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco meetings to establish the UN where the great
powers made it clear to the smaller powers that their choice was to accept an organization
with great power privilege or no organization at all. 152 The veto power was intended ‘‘to
transform a wartime alliance into a big-power oligarchy to secure the hard won peace that
would follow.”153 “The provisions on the structure, procedures, and competences of the
Security Council were then accepted by the fifty nations attending the San Francisco
Conference against considerable opposition from the medium and smaller powers.”
154

Even though the rationale for the veto system was widely recognized as being of

foundational importance to the UN system there have been many attempts to place limits
on the P5 veto powers. 155

150

Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 41 at 110
Jonas von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 1,
http://www.google.com.eg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDcQFjAC&
152
NICO KRISCH, THE GREAT POWERS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 136(Oxford University
Press, 2008)
153
Id. at 63
154
Functions and Powers Article 24, 764
https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/40490/20121220155634_50d327224317a.pdf (The Dumbarton Oaks
Conversations took place in two phases, fi rst between the representatives of the USSR, the UK, and the
US, then between China, the UK, and the US. France did not participate. Th e text of the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals is reproduced in(1946/47) UNYB 4–9 and in UNCIO III, Doc 1 (G/P), 2–23))
155
Sahar Okhovat , The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform 13 ( December
2011 )http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf
151

34

In reality, arguably the first effort to limit the veto came at Dumbarton Oaks when an
Australian proposal to exclude the veto from all arrangements relating to the peaceful
settlement of disputes was put to a vote but failed to attract enough support.156 As Robert
Hill, former Australian ambassador to the United Nations, summarizes, “the Security
Council is a club and P5 is a club within a club”.157After the UN was established there
were several calls to reform the veto power, the most common justification being that the
veto violated the principle of sovereign equality, that it would be used as a tool of great
power domination, and that it would effectively exempt the P5 from being governed by
the Council. 158 One of the most successful endeavor in relation to limiting the veto power
came from within the P5 when in 1950 US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, developed
a proposal designed to neutralize the Soviet Union’s veto power in relation to the Korean
War.

159

In what became known as the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, Acheson came up

with the idea of turning to the UN General Assembly to respond to aggression and threats
to international peace and security when the Council was prevented from fulfilling its
obligations because of the threat of a veto.

160

Since the transfer of an issue from the

Security Council to the General Assembly is considered a procedural matter it was
therefore not subject to the P5 veto.161 Since then, the Uniting for Peace procedure has
been used on more than ten occasions to facilitate UN action short of the use of force but
its use has been rare in recent decades. 162
The 1960s also witnessed a variety of debates about how to reform the Council but these
led only to a change in the number of the members from eleven to fifteen not the veto
power.
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Similarly, the attempts to abolish the veto which took place under the Open-

Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation of and an Increase in
the Membership of the Security Council established by the General Assembly in 1993
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came to nothing.164 In fact, the debate focused on the number of Security Council seats
rather than on veto power.165 The same thing happened in the debates leading up to the
2005 World Summit. Here the options on Security Council reform boiled down to two
under which the Council would increase from 15 to 24 members with neither option
entailing any change in the number of veto wielding powers. 166This process seemed to
confirm the conclusion of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change that there was no practical way of changing the existing members
veto powers.167 What these various cases illustrate is that there have long been arguments
made which seek to limit the use of the veto. The Uniting for Peace Resolution is a way
to overcome limitation of veto power as within the General Assembly each of the 193
members has a voice. This is potentially a vehicle for issuing R2P resolution outside the
Security Council.
The UN’s main goal is to maintain peace and security and both the General Assembly
and the Security Council can cooperate in order to reach this goal.

The General

Assembly is the main deliberative body of the UN. As opposed to the Security Council,
which is exclusive and grants unique veto rights to five nations, all 193 UN member
nations have membership and equal voting rights in the General Assembly.

168

The

General Assembly has several functions according to the UN Charter which are specified
in chapter IV.169 For example the GA can consider and make recommendations on the
general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security,
including disarmament; discuss any question relating to international peace and security
and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security
Council, make recommendations on it; discuss, with the same exception, and make
recommendations on any questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the
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powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations 170. According to the Uniting for
peace resolution of November 1950 resolution 377, the Assembly may also take action if
the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression.171 The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making
recommendations to Members for collective measures to maintain or restore international
peace and security172. This means that the General Assembly can issue the uniting for
peace resolution in order to intervene under the concept of R2P to save civilians from
sever violence or genocide.
A. The relation between the General Assembly and the Security Council
The following section explains in details the relation between the General Assembly and
the Security Council within the UN charter. According to article 1 of the UN Charter the
purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. The organization and
its members must act in order to fulfil the main purpose of the UN.173 The relation
between the Security Council and the General Assembly is not a competitive one; rather,
each organ seeks to facilitate the work of the other in its decision-making. 174 The General
Assembly’s power in maintaining international peace and security was an issue between
the smaller states represented at San Francisco and the big powers.

175

In the Dumbarton

Oaks Proposal, the big powers did not give any real power to the General Assembly. 176
At San Francisco, the smaller states insisted that not all the power should be in the hands
of the Security Council.

177

As a result, Chapter VI of the Charter, which contains the

provisions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, represents a compromise
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between the provisions granting generous powers to the General Assembly and the
provisions attempting to restrict the powers and competence of the Assembly. 178
However, the Assembly’s power in maintaining international peace and security is not
mandatory. It may only make recommendation to the members of the United Nations or
to the Security Council or to both discuss any question relating to international peace and
security, call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to
endanger international peace and security, and ‘recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment of any situation.

179

This means that the General Assembly has the power to

make recommendations based upon its interpretation of a situation that may endanger
international peace and security.

180

The binding decision-making power is vested in the

Security Council either through forceful action or imposing other forms of sanctions
under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, as mentioned the Security Council may also
request that the General Assembly provide a recommendation under Article 12(1). While
the Security Council’s power is exercised in respect to any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly can not make any
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
requests.

181

It is clear that both of them work for the same purpose but there are

differences between them. On one side, the Security Council has five permanent
members with veto power and also the resolutions passed by the SC are binding. On the
other side, the General Assembly is more democratic in the sense that each member has a
vote but the resolutions of the GA according to the UN charter are not binding. The
Uniting for Peace resolution has been used several times to overcome the veto power.
The following section explains in details the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
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B. Uniting for Peace
The following part covers the historical background about the uniting for peace with a
detailed explanation on the case of the Suez Canal and the Uniting for peace resolution
1. Historical background
a. The role of UN in the decolonized world
The idea that the UN has a responsibility to maintain order and protect life in the
decolonized world began to take shape with the creation of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) in response to the Suez crisis of 1956 and the UN operation in
the Congo in 1960.

182

Since that time, the UN and other international actors have

developed and systematized an expansive body of practices aimed at maintaining order
and protecting life in the decolonized world. When the UN was requested to intervene in
the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Congo crisis in July 1960, both the requesting
governments and then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold believed that the UN
could operate as a neutral force to protect life, maintain order and preserve the
independence of newly decolonized states.

183

The Suez and Congo crises were situations

in which the old colonial powers were suddenly confronted with the material effects of
decolonization. The creation of UNEF and UN operation in the Congo in response
changed the landscape of international politics in two ways. 184 On the one hand, those
operations signaled the end of a particular version of informal empire and worked to
delegitimize the resort to force by powerful states with neo imperial ambitions.

185

On the

other hand, the innovations in international executive rule that were consolidated and
developed during that period such as fact-finding, peacekeeping, civilian administration
and centralized forms of technical assistance have since expanded to become core
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techniques for governing the decolonized world. 186 The following part describes the birth
of the uniting for peace resolution.

b. The beginning of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
The Uniting for Peace resolution was a result of the early Cold War division between
East and West. The failure of the Security Council to perform the functions assigned to it
by the Charter because of the veto used by the Soviet Union brought about a change in
the relative power of the Council and the Assembly. 187 The Assembly had to take over the
role of the Security Council when it was difficult to perform its primary responsibility to
maintain international peace and security. 188 The Uniting for Peace resolution therefore
realized broader support among the international community in general, which wanted to
see the United Nations as active as it could be in restoring international peace and
security.

189

As a result it was a great achievement for the General Assembly in

performing its duty to maintain the most fundamental objective of the Charter peace. In
1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The UN Security Council acted rapidly to
deploy UN troops under US General Douglas MacArthur, to repel the North Korean
forces. The Soviet Union was boycotting the UN at the time and thus was not able to
exercise its veto as a permanent member of the Security Council. However, when the
boycott ended the Soviet Union used its veto in the votes. Furthermore, it constantly
questioned the validity of the resolutions of the Security Council adopted in its absence.
This provoked the Council to call for an emergency session of the General Assembly,
which adopted a Uniting for Peace resolution in early November 1950.
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The resolution

was actually a US proposal to make the UN more efficient in dealing with future threats
to the peace. 191 However, the General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions on the
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Korean issue after the Uniting for Peace procedure had been established in resolution 377
(A).

192

Resolution 498 (V), for example, adopted on 1 February 1951, which asked the

members of the UN to increase their assistance to UN Force, perhaps indicates an action
under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution. 193
2. The Suez Canal and the Uniting for Peace resolution
The Uniting for Peace resolution was also used in 1956, at that time the UN faced a major
crisis threatening the stability of the Middle East. The US and UK decided to withdraw
their financial aid for the Aswan Dam.

194

Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal

and stated that all revenues from the canal would be used to finance the project. The
French and British reacted strongly condemning that action.

195

Israel, in coordination

with France and the UK, launched an attack on Egypt. The UN called for the first time an
emergency session this was as a result of the failure of Security Council to take any
actions because of the vetoes of France and UK. The issue was referred to the General
Assembly under the uniting for peace resolution calling for a ceasefire and the
withdrawal of all foreign forces. 196
The UN action in the Suez led to the consolidation of three significant power-shifts in
international relations. It was a moment at which former European imperial powers were
forced to recognize that the conservation of the old colonial system was no longer
possible.197 It was obvious after Suez that powerful states would no longer readily be able
to secure access to resources or strategic advantage through temporary occupation, police
action or land appropriation. 198 In addition, newly independent states would not be free to
deny foreign access to and control over resources. “As an alternative, the Suez operation
sustained a second geopolitical shift the strengthening of an Americanized global
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economy, premised upon openness to investment, free trade, nondiscrimination and the
international management of resources in the decolonized world. Thirdly, the Suez
operation empowered the UN executive function.”

199

3- Debate regarding the General Assembly resolution 377
There was a debate concerning the Uniting for Peace Resolution (resolution 377). The
Uniting for Peace procedure gave rise to a strong debate between the West and the
Socialist countries. The debate was mainly based on political interest as each side was
thinking whether it would benefit or no. In the end according to the UN Charter it was
proven that the resolution was legal:
Resolution
377
(A):
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly consider the
matter immediately with a view to make the appropriate recommendations to
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace,
or act of aggression to use armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 200
a- Possibility of the UNGA substituting the UNSC and issuing the Uniting for peace
resolution
As I stated earlier that the Uniting for Peace procedure gave rise to a debate between the
Western and the Socialist countries, the argument raised by the Soviet Union was that
Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter indicates that the Security Council and the General
Assembly cannot be substituted for one another; they only complement each other. 201By
raising a broader interpretation of Article 12, the pro-West countries argued that when the
Council was paralysed by the veto, it was not functioning in the sense of that provision.
202

Article 12 (1) “while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or

situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly does
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security
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Council so requests.” 203 Article 12(2) “the Secretary-General, with the consent of the
Security Council, notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to
the maintenance of international peace and security . . . or the Members of the United
Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council
ceases to deal with such matters.”204
In reaction, the Soviet Union replied that operation of the veto was an integral function of
the Security Council. Furthermore, the proposed resolution would only require a
procedural vote to transfer the matter from the Security Council to the General Assembly,
while the special session called for under Article 20 needed a substantive vote. What is
more, the Soviet Union argued that Article 11(2) 2 does not allow the General Assembly
to take coercive action, as this action falls solely within the authority of the Security
Council: 205
Article 11 the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member
of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a
Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and,
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any
such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to
both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. 206
In Certain Expenses,

207

the International Court of Justice explained the role of the

General Assembly with regard to the maintenance of the peace. While the Court did not
mention whether the General Assembly could recommend coercive action, it can be
inferred from the Court’s view that the General Assembly is not barred from
recommending enforcement action. 208 The basis of the Uniting for Peace resolution was
to maintain the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, more accurately, the
maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, when the Security Council
fails to perform its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the
203
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General Assembly in which all member states participate need clearly to take up the
responsibility.
The Uniting for Peace resolution represents an interpretation of Article 11(2) and 12 that
has been accepted and acted upon by the members of the United Nations, including the
Soviet Union and all other members originally opposed to the resolution. 209 The Charter
itself declares that the General Assembly can make a recommendation on any important
question, such as maintenance of international peace and security, with a two-thirds
majority of the members present.210 If both the General Assembly and the Security
Council are seized of the same question, it could easily happen that contradictory
solutions may be taken by each of these organs.211 For this reason, it is quite natural that
in this conflict of interest the Assembly should give way to that organ which is primarily
responsible for the matter concerned. Therefore the Charter provides that the General
Assembly cannot make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while
the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of such dispute or situation
(Article 12).212
After this debate all about the Uniting for Peace Resolution countries were reassured in
particular after the ICJ advisory opinion that the General Assembly can issue the uniting
for peace resolution. In addition, this right is within its duty that the UN charter imposed.
213

However, the legality of the Uniting for Peace resolution may still be questioned on a

different issue. The Charter under Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits any kind of threat of
force or use of force against the political independence and the territorial integrity of any
state.

214

The only exceptions are action in self-defense under Article 51 and military

action by the Security Council under Article 42.

215

The question arises whether an

authorization by the General Assembly to use force may lead to a violation of Article
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2(4). 216 The exceptions to the ban on the use of force are those undertaken in legitimate
self-defense and those authorized by the United Nations. In the case of the Uniting for
Peace Resolution, the General Assembly was only playing the role that should have been
played by the Security Council. The inability of the Security Council to act caused this
responsibility to be transferred to the General Assembly.

217

By its authorization in the

resolution the General Assembly did not in fact pose any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The General Assembly tends to
resist aggression that has threatened the world peace.

218

For example, in the Korean

conflict in 1950 the authorization of use of force was intended to help defend South
Korea from the North Korean invasion; no offensive action was authorized. Therefore, it
was only a self-defense measure.219 Article 51 of the Charter justifies collective selfdefense. This means that the General Assembly plays the role of the Security Council
which was not possible as a result of the veto power of the P5.

220

However, the Uniting

for Peace resolution is not binding.
b. Legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution within the UN Charter
This section explores the legality of the uniting Peace resolution within the UN charter.
In order to know whether it is possible to use the 377 resolution it is important to specify
when exactly it can be used and under which chapter of the UN. 221 Under Part A
paragraph 1 of the Resolution, the General Assembly can consider any case where there
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, whenever the
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of its permanent members, fails to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. 222 In that case, the General Assembly can consider the matter immediately with
a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.
Among these measures even the use of armed force might be recommended, if there is a
216
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breach of peace or act of aggression. 223 The Resolution refers only to the highest degree
of danger to peace. The Charter distinguishes several degrees of danger. The lower
degree, motivating the application of Chapter VI, is represented by disputes or situations
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security Articles 33 and 34, 224 there the danger for peace is farther.

225

However, action

under Chapter VII takes place only in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression Article 39. 226Chapter VII coordinates rather different cases of danger
to peace: on the one hand, cases where there is a great danger to peace, but the peace is
not yet broken; on the other hand, cases where a breach of the peace has already
occurred.227 Article 39 makes no distinction between the two groups: in both groups of
cases the use of even the strongest enforcement measures is equally authorized. The
Resolution makes a distinction and provides different effects for each of the two groups.
It reserves the use of armed forces only for those cases where the imminent danger has
changed into an actual breach of peace or act of aggression.

228

In this case fighting has already started and the means to suppress it might have recourse
to fighting as well. On the contrary, where a threat to the peace exists, be it in the highest
degree, but peace is not yet broken, fighting would start by collective action at a moment
when there is perhaps a minor hope of preventing the threat to peace and of avoiding
fighting from arising out of a breach of peace or act of aggression.

229

Andrassy states

that “It is therefore reasonable to postpone the use of the extreme remedy till the moment
when it is patent that the use of arms cannot be avoided. 230 “ Reicher states that
The phrases "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or” act of aggression,"
when analyzed in the context of Chapters VI and VII, take a situation out of the
former and place it squarely within the latter. When applied to the Uniting for
Peace Resolution, therefore, these phrases create a definite limitation of a
substantive nature, in as much as it is only when a problem reaches the level of
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gravity contemplated in Chapter VII that the General Assembly may act under
Part A of the Resolution; a simple Chapter VI situation is insufficient. 231
c. Conditions that must be fulfilled before the General Assembly can proceed and issue
Uniting for Peace Resolution
After analyzing the legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution according to the UN
Charter, I will focus on this section in exploring in details the conditions which need to
be fulfilled before the General Assembly can proceed and issue Uniting for Peace
Resolution. Part A of the resolution begins with what may be referred to as the essential
pre-conditions the conditions which must be fulfilled before the Assembly may take any
steps under the provisions which follow: "If the Security Council, because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”232
Four essential preconditions must be met before the General Assembly may proceed:
The Security Council must have failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.

233

Furthermore, there must appear to be

"a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." In addition, The Security
Council's failure to exercise its primary responsibility must have been occasioned by one
reason and one reason alone-the lack of unanimity of its permanent members.

234

This

amounts to a significant constraint on the Assembly. If, for instance, the permanent
members agree unanimously that the best course to follow is one of non-interferenceinaction this precondition will not have been fulfilled and the Assembly will have no
recourse under Resolution 377A (V), even if inaction is presumed to amount to failure.235
The same would apply if the permanent members found themselves to be in unanimous
agreement in opposing a resolution proposing concrete action. The Uniting for Peace
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Resolution, having been framed with the veto power in mind, only applies in cases of
lack of unanimity. 236
For the Uniting for Peace procedure, firstly the obligation under the Resolution is on the
General Assembly to consider a matter immediately. “That is all very well as long as the
Assembly happens to be in session at the relevant time. If, on the other hand, it is not in
session-as was the case when the Afghanistan question arose”237it may meet in an
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request Article 27(2). 238 This
article provides that “decisions on procedural matters, while requiring nine affirmative
votes, do not require the unanimity of the Council's permanent members. Requesting a
meeting of the General Assembly is a procedural matter.”239Therefore, the Resolution
declares as sufficient a simple majority as provided for procedural questions Article 27,
paragraph 2.

240

Paragraph 1 of Part A concludes with two alternative procedures for

convening an- emergency session: "Such emergency session shall be called if requested
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the
Members of the United Nations." 241
d. The General Assembly in Peacekeeping
This next section clarifies the General Assembly‘s role in authorization Peacekeeping
forces. Peacekeeping forces were first used in 1956, when Israel, and later the United
236
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Kingdom and France, invaded Egypt due to its nationalization of the Suez Canal and the
General Assembly authorized a peacekeeping force in order to restore peace in the
region. Moreover, the General Assembly did so when the vetoes of the United Kingdom
and France had paralysed the Security Council. This course of events caused a debate
over whether the General Assembly may authorize enforcement measures or whether the
authorization of a peacekeeping mission is necessarily intended as an enforcement
measure. 242
In its advisory opinion in the Certain Expenses, the ICJ clearly stated that “Article 24 of
the Charter gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for ensuring prompt and
effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 243However, the
General Assembly must also concern itself with international peace and security. Article
14 of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to recommend measures for the
peaceful adjustment of any situation. 244 The word ‘measures’ implies some kind of
action, and the only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the
restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend
measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Security
Council requests the Assembly to do so. Accordingly, the advisory opinion continues:
Whenever the General Assembly proceeds under Article 11 or under Article 14,
the implementation of its recommendations for setting up commissions or other
bodies involves organizational activity – action – in connection with the
maintenance of international peace and security. Such implementation is a normal
feature of functioning of the United Nations. Such committees, commissions or
other bodies or individuals, constitute, in some cases, subsidiary organs
established under the authority of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the
General Assembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs include, for
example, investigation, observation and supervision, but the way in which such
subsidiary organs are utilized depends on the consent of the state or states
245
concerned.
The main question is therefore the division of functions between the Security Council and
the General Assembly. The function of the General Assembly under Article 14 may lead
to an action once committees or commissions are set up for the implementation of its
242
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resolution. This action may not however be a forceful one, unlike the ones the Security
Council may initiate under Chapter VII of the Charter. For the implementation of an
investigation, supervision or observation, the General Assembly must reach an agreement
with the host state or states.

246

Therefore, action taken by the General Assembly is still a

recommendatory measure leaving final acceptance of the measure upon the willingness
of the state or states to which it is addressed.

247

The implementation of a measure

recommended by the General Assembly depends upon whether the state or states are
willing to comply with the relevant resolution; that is, it is an absolutely voluntary
measure.

248

The General Assembly may play an important role through the authorization

of peacekeeping forces in separating adversaries, maintaining cease-fires, delivering
humanitarian relief, helping refugees and displaced persons return to their homes,
demobilizing combatants, and creating conditions that, for example, promote democracy
and allow for free elections to be held. 249 All these require action in a sense, perhaps not
similar to the forceful measures envisaged in Chapter VII but certainly ones that help
reduce the threat to international peace. 250
The Soviet Union opposed the idea of establishing the peacekeeping force known as the
UN Emergency Force after the Suez crisis, even if it visibly wanted the United Kingdom
and France out of the Suez.251 The argument of the Soviet Union and its allies was that
the Charter has very specific provisions for the use of force by the United Nations.
252

Soviet Union and its allies cited the agreements on UN forces required under Article

43 of the Charter. As the requirement of Article 43 was not followed in forming the UN
Emergency Force, and as alternatives were not provided in the Charter, it was necessarily
unlawful.

253

Nevertheless ,the supporters of the UN peacekeeping forces argued that it

was not only the Security Council that could mobilize the UN police; where the use of
veto in the Security Council makes the initiative unsuccessful, the General Assembly can
246
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form such a body to maintain the peace. The idea of such peacekeeping forces was then
supported by the majority in voting in the UN bodies.

254

In the Certain Expenses case, the International Court of Justice decided all the relevant
questions concerning the legality of the establishment of peacekeeping forces.

255

In

response to the argument made by the Soviet Union and France that only the Security
Council could authorize and supervise peacekeeping activities, the Court stated that the
Council’s responsibility for maintaining international peace and security is primary, not
exclusive.256 It noted that the General Assembly is also concerned with such matters.257
The Assembly does not have to defer to the Security Council under Article 11(2) of the
Charter unless enforcement action is necessary.

258

The Court also pointed out that the

function of peacekeeping forces is not similar to that of the enforcement measures for
which Article 43 conditions are to be met.

259

The issue was that the forces UNEF and

ONUC were not authorized to take action against a state. However, they were sent with
the consent of the states concerned.

260

They were not authorized to act against the host

state but rather were cooperating with it. In general, the General Assembly may play an
important role by establishing peacekeeping forces to mitigate escalation of a situation
that could cause a serious threat to the peace if no such measure is taken. 261
In the framework of the relevant phrases in paragraph 1 of Part A of Resolution 377A(V)
suggests that if the Security Council has failed to exercise its primary peacekeeping
responsibility in a case which it has defined to fall within Chapter VII, then the General
Assembly may act. 262However significant and wide the power in Part A may be, though,
it has built into it an important limitation arising from the fact that the authority to
recommend the use of armed force is confined to situations involving "a breach of the
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peace or act of aggression. 263 In relation to the Security Council's powers in the area of
international peacekeeping, Chapters VI and VII distinguish between relatively less and
more serious cases, with the stronger powers in Chapter VII reserved for the latter. The
threshold of applicability of Chapter VII is found in the phrases "threat to the peace,"
"breach of the peace," or "act of aggression”. Only in these circumstances may the
Security Council itself invoke its more serious powers, including the use of force. 264
In concluding the General Assembly has peacekeeping powers but there are three
limitations:
1. The first of these is the applicability of Article 12. However, this is a mere
formality if a majority of nine members of the Security Council are prepared to
vote for the removal of the relevant item from the agenda.
2. Resolutions pursuant to Articles 10, 11 and 14, insofar as they contain
"recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and
security," require a two-thirds majority for passage in the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly may only "recommend." if a sufficient number of states
are interested and willing to lend their support in carrying out a recommendation;
there is no reason why it cannot be as effective as a binding decision. 265
e. the Uniting for Peace in practice
This section illustrates the Uniting for Peace resolution in practice. I will refer to several
cases in which the Uniting for Peace resolution was used. Several scholars argue that the
Uniting for Peace was not used many times. In the 1980s, and writing on the occasion of
the 30th anniversary of the Uniting for Pease resolution, Reicher stated that “despite the
passage of three decades, the Resolution has been invoked on only a handful of
occasions.”

266

The thirtieth anniversary, coupled with the occurrences of the use of the

resolution particularly in the Afghanistan case. The Security Council had in fact
considered the Afghanistan question, but the non-passage of the draft resolution had
prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. 267 Reicher argues that:
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The failure had been brought about by the lack of unanimity of its permanent
members. Finally, the substantive precondition in the Uniting for Peace
Resolution had, in the Council's view, been fulfilled-a fact to be inferred from the
transmission of the case to the General Assembly pursuant to that Resolution. 268
The cases of Suez, Hungary, the Congo, Bangladesh and Afghanistan were considerably
clearer in this respect, as in each case the Security Council itself passed the matter to the
General Assembly by resolution.

269

In the Lebanese case, while the Security Council

did- not refer to the Uniting for Peace Resolution in its Resolution 129 (1958),270 which
passed the matter to the Assembly, it was referred to the GA as emerging from the
Uniting for Peace Resolution by calling "an emergency special session" of the Assembly.
It is clear that the Uniting for Peace was not used many times after 30 years of its birth.
Even after 60 years the situation didn’t change as Cowling argues that:
The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been utilized on a number of occasions
since it was passed in 1950. It did not play any role in the Korean conflict since
the Russian government had withdrawn from the SC which meant that the
intervention of the west would not be impeded by the Russian veto. He also says
that it was also stressed that the GA can only make recommendations and not
binding decisions (as is the case with the SC) and that the use of military
enforcement action must be precipitated by a determination as to the existence of
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression by the Council. 271

The Problem with the Uniting for Peace is that it is not binding. Several scholars who
argue that the Uniting for peace could be a solution in order to overcome the veto power
within the Security Council. However, they argue that the resolution is not binding.
The General assembly is responsible to maintain international peace and security in case
the Security Council fails to maintain peace and security. According to Hossain the UN
Charter imposes primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security upon the Security Council. Then what is left for the General Assembly is rather
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secondary or subsidiary in this regard.

272

Despite the restricted power given to the

General Assembly by the Charter, an extension of the power is found in the resolution
adopted during the early cold war period called Uniting for Peace. The issue is the
legality of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.

273

The Charter under Article 2(4) explicitly

prohibits any kind of threat of force or use of force against the political independence and
the territorial integrity of any state with the exception of self-defense under Article
51.274The issue is that can the authorization by the General Assembly to use force be
considered as a violation of Article 2(4). In the case of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution,
the General Assembly was only playing the role that should be played by the Security
Council. As the he Security Council is unable to act this responsibility is transferred to
the General Assembly. By its authorization in the resolution the General Assembly did
not cause any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. 275
The Uniting for peace resolution could be a way to overcome the veto power but the
problem is that the resolution is not binding. However, still the Uniting for Peace
resolution can have an influence even if this is not always the case as it can push
supportive countries to take actions. According to Okhovat “it may seem that there is no
preventive measure against the use of veto and limitless power of the permanent
members”276 but he says that this is not the case. During the early phases of Korean War,
the USA, concerned by the Soviet Union’s repeated use of veto power and fearing those
actions might prevent the Council from protecting South Korea considering that the
USSR supported North Korea took the matter to the General Assembly. 277 With support
from many countries the UN adopted a General Assembly resolution which is the Uniting
for Peace in November 1950. This resolution reaffirms it is important that the Security
Council carries out its responsibility in maintaining international peace and security and
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that the permanent members limit their use of the veto power.

278

This resolution further

recognizes that the failure of the Security Council in fulfilling those tasks will not relieve
the United Nations of its responsibilities under the Charter to maintain international peace
and security.

279

Thus, when the permanent members of the Security Council find that

they are at odds and fail to reach unanimity on a matter that appears to be a threat to
international peace and security, this resolution authorizes the General Assembly to
immediately consider that matter and issue its own appropriate recommendations to the
Member States for collective measures. “Those collective measures can include the use
of armed force when necessary.”

280

As a result, this resolution gives the GA final

responsibility rather than secondary responsibility. Okhovar contends that “it can be held
as a way to bypass the Security Council and a means for the General Assembly to
overrule the vetoes of the UN Security Council P5 members.” 281
The Uniting for Peace as I stated could be a way to push countries to take an action. Even
though not frequent, this resolution has been applied during the GA’s history. One
successful example of its application was in 1981 when South Africa was preventing the
independence of Namibia.

282

The General Assembly by using this resolution

recommended sanctions against South Africa and assistance including military assistance
to those who were fighting for Namibian independence. The resolutions passed by the
GA using the provisions of “Uniting for Peace” are not binding (as none of the General
Assembly resolutions are).

283

Nevertheless, because of their nature, these resolutions can

carry more weight and can press supportive countries to take actions. It was what
happened regarding South Africa.284 As Richard Schifter, the former US Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights explains, the resolution on South Africa passed
under “Uniting for Peace” principles, was a significant step in the process of imposing
sanctions on apartheid South Africa and de-legitimizing the country.
278
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285

Therefore,

bypassing the Security Council is not impossible, it can happen through the use of
“Uniting for Peace” resolution. 286
The Uniting for Peace resolution has kind of moral effect as it can be used as a moral
pressure to achieve peace and security which is useful. Even if the resolution is not
binding but this kind of pressure can at least be a way to try to maintain peace and
security. Asamoah evaluate the legal effect of the GA resolutions. He stated that “it is
important to distinguish between the binding nature and the legal effect of resolutions of
the General Assembly.”

287

Moreover, resolutions may have a legal effect even though

they are not considered by states to be binding upon them. Furthermore, the scope of
legal effect is wider than that of legally binding. The binding nature of resolutions is only
one aspect of the legal effect that can be considered. In this context the legal basis of the
particular resolution becomes relevant and the charter provisions on the competence of
the General Assembly must be considered. Most essential, is the influence of General
Assembly resolutions upon the growth of the rules of international law.

288

He added that:

Apart from their legal effect, resolutions may have other purposes and results.
They are generally recognized, for example, as expressions of the moral
conscience of mankind and therefore capable of exerting moral pressure. It may
not be desirable to depend on moral force alone, but it must be remembered that
in the absence of an international enforcement authority, one of the means of
insuring obedience to the rules of the international order is the moral reprobation
attaching to their infraction.289
In sum, moral pressure is only part of the solution but it can not always be a way to
achieve peace and security. For that reason Uniting for Peace can not be considered a
way to overcome the veto power. It is mandatory that the international community find
other solutions. Some scholars think that the uniting for peace resolution is not really a
solution to overcome the veto power. They argue that the UN needs reform especially
within the Security Council or the general assembly.
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According to Voeten, the ‘Uniting for Peace’ could no longer be used effectively. After
the early 1960s, when the US and the West lost their majority in the UNGA as the
Western powers used the temporary absence of the USSR in 1950 to allow the UNGA
authority to take measures to preserve international peace and security if the UNSC were
deadlocked. Following that, the UNGA still passed many resolutions related to security,
but they were more often ignored and produced few public goods.

290

For example, US

President Ronald Reagan famously claimed that the 1983 UNGA resolution condemning
the United States for its intervention in Grenada “didn’t upset his breakfast at all”

291

Voeten added that the solution is to reform the UN and he illustrate that by giving
previous example such as the case of the transformation of the GATT to WTO. He stated
that:
In the past fifteen years, we have witnessed major institutional reforms and
innovations in the international arena. The EU broadened, deepened, and moved
increasingly towards a supranational decision-making structure. NATO accepted
new member states and modernized its military command structure. The
international trade system was transformed fundamentally by the replacement of
GATT with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its highly legalized
dispute-resolution mechanism. . . The UN Security Council (UNSC) is an
important example. What makes the UNSC’s institutional persistence so
interesting is that its activities have changed rather dramatically with the Cold
War’s ending.292
ehta also thinks that the solution to overcome the veto power should be by reforming

the UN. As the General Assembly needs to regain its powers as this will have impact on
the resolutions related to R2P concept.

293

The Charter makes it clear that the General

Assembly of all member states is the primary UN body. Article 15 says that “the
Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security
Council…and from the other Organs of the United Nations”. 294 The chief limitation on its
powers comes from Article 12 which lies down that when the Security Council is
exercising its functions in dealing with matters of peace and security the Assembly
290
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refrain from making any recommendations.

295

“While this is a necessary condition it

should be modified by a new rule which should be mutually agreed by both
institutions.”296He added that:
The powers of the General Assembly should be enhanced so that it can play a
vital role debating and deciding important international issues. At present, each
autumn, it is faced with a daunting agenda. On a positive note, the General
Assembly has powers which can be activated for bringing Peace as the Uniting
for Peace resolution of 1950 which was used to override the monopoly of Security
Council for resolving the war in Suez. However, the resolution is not binding. The
UN need to be more transparent and democratic institution. 297
These points of view show that it is really necessary to overcome the veto power within
the Security Council in order to have fair decisions concerning the resolutions related to
R2P. The Uniting for Peace resolution could be a solution as all members of the General
Assembly could participate in deciding whether or not R2P resolution is necessary. Some
others think that as a moral effect Uniting for Peace could have an impact in deciding
whether to intervene or not in a state under the concept of R2P. I think that Uniting for
Peace may be in some cases a way to achieve a fair decision in deciding whether to
intervene or not even if it is not binding.
4- The future of the Uniting for Peace and the concept of R2P
It is clear from this analysis that according to the UN Charter the General Assembly’s
resolutions are not binding and that the Uniting for Peace Resolution can only be
implemented if the members of the UN really wants to issue a resolution and to intervene
under the concept of R2P. The issue is that in our days which witnesses many crises such
as the case of Libya298 or Cote d’Ivore299 we really need the UN to authorize resolutions
which can save the civilians for crime against humanity or genocide. However, these
resolutions should not depend on politics like what it happing currently with Syria. In
2012 the Security Council failed to adapt draft resolution on Syria as a result of Russia
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and China’s veto.300 The UN members in order to end this violence went to the General
Assembly which issued a resolution that condemns the human violation done by the
regime but the GA’s resolutions are not binding. The issue is that can the GA uniting for
peace resolution be considered a solution for the Syrian crisis. As I mentioned earlier that
General Assembly invoke the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (377 A), a measure
established to continue the deadlock at the Security Council. The “Uniting for Peace”
famously did succeed in 1950 .In this case, it served as a way of authorizing “collective
measures” including the “use of armed force” during the Korean War, despite consistent
Soviet vetoes in the UNSC.

301

As I stated earlier an Emergency Special Session (ESS) of

the General Assembly can be called either by a procedural vote in the UNSC or within 24
hours of a majority of General Assembly members requesting one of the UN SecretaryGeneral. Taking this into consideration in the case of Syria if a resolution was passed for
Syria similarly authorizing the use of force, this would provide a legal justification for
intervention. Weiss stated that:
The main difficulty, of course, would be convincing the majority of the General
Assembly members to support it, a contingency that seems remote without
strenuous lobbying from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), which has 57 member states drawn from the Muslim-majority
and Arab countries. 302
Finally after all this we can conclude that the Uniting for peace is a way to overcome the
P5 power but as it is not binding this will depend on the well of the members to use it.
The international community still needs to find a solution to overcome the veto control.
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V. Conclusion
The UN was created in order to maintain peace and security. In order to achieve this goal
the concept of responsibility to protect was born after the Rwanda genocide as a way to
intervene to protect civilians. The concept of R2P passed through several phases starting
from the birth of the idea followed by the feeling of the international community to issue
reports in order to clarify the importance of this concept. Then the third phase in which
UN issued resolution legalizing R2P. The concept of R2P does not contradict the UN
charter. The R2P concept does not change anything it is only a way for the Security
Council to enforce its action. In addition, UN Charter recognizes legitimate roles for
regional organizations and regional arrangements in Chapter VIII. The general assembly
also has a role in maintaining peace and security and in case the Security Council fails to
reach its main purpose the General Assembly can do this through the Uniting for Peace
resolution. The Uniting for Peace resolution is a way to overcome the veto control and
allows the 193 members to have a voice in deciding whether it is necessary to intervene
in a country to save its civilians from crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes or
no. However, the Uniting for Peace Resolution is not binding which means that the
international community needs to find another solution to overcome the dominance of the
P5.
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